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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE VERSION
Abstract
In this paper we consider a class of structural econometric models in which
the distribution of the endogenous variables is implicitly dened as the solution
of a xed-point problem. We propose a simple two-stage estimator which does
not require the econometrician to solve the xed point problem, and provide
sucient conditions for its consistency and asymptotic eciency. We show that
these sucient conditions hold if a Newton operator is used to solve the xed
point problem. Finally, we study the nite sample performance of this estimator
in the context of several structural models: a dynamic discrete choice model,
a static game with incomplete information, a model of irreversible investment,
and a model of oligopolistic competition in a dierentiated product market.
1 Introduction
The concept of equilibrium in economics is intimately related to the mathemati-
cal concept of xed point. Many interesting economic models involve xed point
problems in highly dimensional spaces. Bellman equations characterizing the value
function of a dynamic decision model, or best response functions dening the equi-
librium of a game are two examples. During the last two decades techniques for the
estimation of structural econometric versions of these models have been developed.1
1Recent literature on this topic is very extensive. In the context of dynamic discrete choice
structural models see the seminal papers by Wolpin (1984), Miller (1984), Pakes (1986), Rust (1987),
Hotz and Miller (1993), Keane and Wolpin (1996), and the survey by Rust (1994). For static game
theoretic models see Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1994), Berry, Levinshon and Pakes (1996),
and the survey by Pakes (1994). For the estimation of general equilibrium models using micro data
see Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) and the recent survey by Browning, Hansen and Heckman
1Although methods which make full use of the restrictions embodied in the theoretical
model, such as full maximum likelihood estimation, are desirable for eciency and,
sometimes, identication reasons, these methods require the use of computationally
burdensome nested solution-estimation algorithms which are often not feasible in all
but the simplest models.
In this paper we consider a class of structural econometric models in which the
distribution of the endogenous variables can be dened as the solution of a xed-point
problem. We propose a simple two-stage estimator which avoids repeated solution
of the xed point problem. The rst stage involves non-parametric estimation of
the distribution of endogenous variables. In the second stage a pseudo-likelihood
function is maximized. Given parameter values, the pseudo-likelihood function is
computed by a single iteration on the xed point operator, using the rst stage
non-parametric estimates as starting values. Our two-stage estimator is the value of
the structural parameters that maximizes this pseudo-likelihood function. We state
regularity conditions for consistency of this estimator and provide additional sucient
conditions under which the two-stage estimator can be used instead of a maximum
likelihood estimator with no loss of asymptotic eciency. We also show that these
sucient conditions will be satised if a Newton operator is used to solve the xed
point problem. Finally, we study the performance of this estimator in nite samples
for several specic examples: a dynamic programming discrete choice model, a static
game with incomplete information, a model of irreversible investment, and a model
of oligopolistic competition in a dierentiated product market.
The idea behind our estimator builds on previous work by Hotz and Miller (1993),
Manski (1993) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (1999) in the context of dynamic dis-
crete choice models. This paper extends this previous literature in several directions.
First, we consider a general class of structural models where the distribution of the
endogenous variables is implicitly dened as a xed point. Second, we show that
the two-stage estimator is asymptotically ecient under conditions that seem quite
general.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general
econometric model and illustrate it with four examples. In section 3 we dene the two-
stage estimator and present our main results of consistency and asymptotic eciency.
In Section 4 [NOT INCLUDED IN THIS VERSION] we present our Monte Carlo
experiments. The method used to obtain the second stage estimator can be extended
to dene K-stage estimators (i.e., K > 2) which, although asymptotically equivalent,
may have better nite sample properties. Our experiments will compare the nite
sample performance performance of ML, 2 and K-stage estimators in the dierent
example models.
(1999). Finally, Ericson and Pakes (1995), Pakes and McGuire (1995), and Pakes, Gowrisankaran
and McGuire (1995) present a very interesting and promising framework for empirical analysis of
Markov-Perfect equilibria in dynamic games.
22 Econometric model
Let y 2 Y  NL and x 2 X  NM be two vectors of discrete random variables,
where N is the space of the natural numbers. Let p(y0;x0) be the true probability
(i.e., probability in the population) of y = y0 conditional on x = x0, and dene ~ p as
the vector with all the true probabilities, i.e., ~ p  fp(y0;x0) : y0 2 Y ;x0 2 Xg. A
parametric model for ~ p is a family of probability distributions
f~ p() :  2 g; (1)
where ~ p() = fp(y0;x0;) : y0 2 Y ;x0 2 Xg and  is a nite vector of parameters.
We are interested in models with the following properties.
Property 1: For any  2 , ~ p() is the unique xed point in  of the mapping:
 = ~ 	(;) (2)
where ~ 	(;)  f	(y0;x0;;) : y0 2 Y ;x0 2 Xg, and 	(:) is twice continuously
dierentiable in (;).
Property 2: For any pair (;), ~ 	(;)is a probability distribution for y condi-
tional on x.
Property 3: There is a unique vector in , say 











where fp(x0)g is the true marginal distribution of x.
Given a random sample of y and x, fxi;yi : i = 1;2;:::;ng, we are interested in
the estimation of 





where the probabilities p(yi;xi;) satisfy ~ p() = ~ 	(; ~ p[]).
2.1 Example 1: Discrete choice dynamic programming model
Consider a dynamic programming model where y 2 Y = f1;2;:::;Jg is the discrete
decision variable, and s 2 S is the vector of state variables (see Rust 1994a, 1994b).
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Utility is time separable, the discount factor
is , and U(yt;st) represents the one-period utility function. The time horizon of
the decision problem is innite. An agent's beliefs about uncertain future states
3can be represented by a Markov transition probability fs(dst+1jst;yt) . According
to these assumptions, the value function and the optimal decision rule are time in-
variant (Blackwell's theorem). Let V (y;s) be the value function conditional on the
(hypothetical) choice of alternative y. These conditional choice value functions are
implicitly dened by the Bellman equations





0js;y) for y = 1;2;:::;J (4)
We partition the state vector as follows: s = (x;"), where x includes the state
variables which the econometrician observes and " those that are unobservable. We
assume Conditional Independence; that is, the transition probability of the state
variables factors as:
fs(xt+1;"t+1j xt;"t;yt) = f"("t+1j xt+1) fx(xt+1j xt;yt) (5)
where f"(:) has nite rst moments and is continuous and twice dierentiable in ". Let
EU(y;x) be the expected (one-period) utility conditional on x and on the hypothetical
choice of alternative y, and dene (y;x;")  U(y;s)   EU(y;x). Similarly, let
EV (y;x) be the expected value function conditional on x. Using these denitions
and the conditional independence assumption, it is simple to verify that:
V (y;s) = EV (y;x) + (y;x;")
Notice that, by construction, ~ (x;")  ([1;x;"];[2;x;"];:::;[J;x;"])0 is mean in-
dependent of x.
Suppose the primitives of the model fU;fx;f";g are known up to a nite vector
of parameters . Let p(y0;x0;) be the probability that alternative y0 is the optimal







j2Y fEV (j;x;) + (j;x;")g

f"(d"jx;) (6)
where I(:) is the indicator function. Given the conditional independence assumption,
and the mean independence of ~ (x;") and x, it is possible to obtain an expression
for EV (y;x;) in terms of the primitives U fx;f" and the set of choice probabilities
~ p() (see Hotz and Miller, 1993, and Aguirregabiria and Mira, 1999). We denote
this function by (y;x;; ~ p[]). This function (:) can be evaluated at any arbitrary
vector of choice probabilities , "optimal" or not. In general, (y;x;;) represents
the expected value of choosing alternative y today if future decisions are based on
the choice probabilities in . If x is discrete, i.e., x 2 fx1;x2;:::;xMg, it is possible to
show that (j;xm;;) is the m   th component of the vector:











~ U(k) + e(k;)
i)
(7)
4where E ~ Ux(j) is the vector of one period utilities conditional on y = j and all states;
F j
x is the matrix of transition probabilities of x conditional on y = j; j is the
subvector of  associated with alternative j; F U
x () is the matrix of unconditional
transition probabilities induced by , i.e., F U
x () =
PJ
j=1 j  F j
x; and e(j;) is a
vector of functions of : the form of these functions depends on the distribution of "
(e.g., if ~ (x;") has an extreme value distribution e(j;) =  lnj).2
Therefore, we can write the set of conditional choice probabilities ~ p() as the






j2Y f(j;x;;) + (j;x;")g

f"(d"jx;) (8)






2.2 Example 2: Static game with incomplete information4
Consider an N-player game, and let i 2 f1;2;:::;Ng be the index that denotes a
player. The payo function for player i is Ui(yi;y i;x;"i), where yi represents his
own action and y i is the vector of actions of the other players. The set of choice
alternatives is discrete, i.e., yi 2 Y = f1;2;:::;Jg. x is a vector of exogenous charac-
teristics of all players and/or the environment which is known by all players, whereas
"i represents characteristics of player i which are private information. Each player
knows the other players' payo functions up to the private information components;
furthermore, every player has a subjective probability distribution over the "0s of the
other players, Gi(" i;x;"i), where " i = f"j : j 6= ig.
Notice that, without further assumptions, players are unable to calculate equilib-
ria on their own because each player i is ignorant of the subjective beliefs of the others.
Here we assume that it is known to all players that conditional on x the private infor-
mation components "0
is are independently and identically distributed over individuals
with cumulative distribution function F(";x); therefore, Gi(" i;x;"i) =
Q
j6=i F("j;x),
which is the same for all players.
Let i(x;"i) be a strategy function for player i. Dene Vi(yi;x;"i; i;) as player
i's expected payo from choosing action yi, conditional on x and "i and given that




2More specically, e(j;) = fe(j;xm;) : m = 1;2;:::;Mg, where e(j;x;) is the expected value
of (j;x;") conditional on x and on the choice of alternative j, if choices are made according to the
choice probabilities in .
3See Lemma 1 in Aguirregabiria and Mira (1999) for a proof of the existence and uniqueness of
this xed point.
4This example is based on Rust (1994b).
5Player i chooses yi in order to maximize his expected payo . A Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium in this game is a collection of strategies fy
i(x;"i) : i = 1;2;:::;Ng such













j(x;"j) : j 6= ig.
Now suppose the econometrician observes x and actions fyig. Players are assumed
to choose equilibrium actions and to have rational expectations; i.e.,
Q
j F("j;x) is the
true distribution of " given x. The payo functions and the probability distribution of











Let ~ p() be the vector fpi(y;x;) : y 2 Y ;x 2 X;i = 1;2;:::;Ng. Notice that these
probabilities are the ones that a player uses to predict the behavior of the other
players. Therefore, we can use these probabilities to obtain an alternative expression
for the expected payo functions Vi(:) evaluated at the equilibrium strategies of the
other players, y
 i. We denote these functions by i(yi;x;"i;; ~ p[]).










where ym[y i] represents the choice of individual m in the vector y i. The functions
i(:) can be evaluated at any vector of choice probabilities, equilibrium or not. For an
arbitrary vector of choice probabilities, i(:) represents the expected payo function
under the hypothesis that the decision of the other players will be based on these
probabilities. We can combine equations (12) and (13) to write the set of equilibrium
choice probabilities ~ p() as a solution of the xed point equation  = ~ 	(;), where









As an example of this rather general setup, consider the market of a dierentiated
product as in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1991) or Berry, Levinshon and Pakes
(1995). There are N rms in this market, and each of these rms sells one variety
of the product. The demand is the result of a logit model, i.e., the demand for the









6where M is the market size; (;) are parameters; variety 0 is the outside alternative;
xi represents a vector of exogenous characteristics of variety i that aect consumers'
utility; di is the price of variety i, and d i is the vector of prices for the other varieties.
We assume that for the outside alternative x0
0   d0 = 0.
The unit cost of producing variety i is ci, that depends on characteristics xi but
also on a rm specic eciency component "i.
ci = expfx
0
i + "ig (16)
Therefore, the prot function is:
U(di;d i;xi;x i;"i) = [di   exp(x
0
i + "i)] D(di;d i;xi;x i) (17)
The characteristics fxig are known by all the rms in the market, but the relative
eciency of a rm f"ig is private information of that rm. We assume that it is
known to all players that conditional on x the private information components "0
is are
independently and identically distributed over individuals with zero mean, constant
variance 2, and normal distribution; therefore, Gi(" i;x;"i) =
Q
k6=i ("k=), which
is the same for all players. Finally, the set of possible prices is discrete, i.e., di 2 D =
fd[1];d[2];:::;d[J]g.
Let  be the vector of model parameters,  = (;
0;0;)0. Let pi(d;x;) be the
probability that rm i chooses price d in the equilibrium of a market with character-
istics x and parameters . Dene ~ p() as the vector of probabilities fp(d;xi;x i;) :
d 2 D;xi 2 X;x i 2 XN 1g. It is possible to show that the expression for the























2.3 Example 3: Model of irreversible investment5
Consider a rm that produces a good using labor and physical capital as inputs. The
rm purchases the capital that it employs and it operates in a competitive market
both for the output and for the inputs. There are no adjustment costs associated
with labor. Let F(kt;t) be the production function net of labor costs (once the
5See Abel and Eberly (1996) and Abel et al (1996) for a version of this model in continuous time.
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) present a similar model in the context of labor demand with linear
hiring and ring costs.
7optimal amount of labor has been solved), where kt is the stock of physical capital
at the beginning of period t, and t is a productivity shock. F(k;) is continuous,
dierentiable, strictly concave in k, and limk!0 F(k;) = 1. The rm's current
prot function is:
U(kt;t;ct;it) = F(kt;t)   ct I(it > 0)it   c
u
t I(it < 0)it, (20)
where it is investment in physical capital; ct is the price that the rm should pay
when buying new equipment; and cu
t is the price that the rm receives when it sells
its used capital in the second hand market. Due to asymmetric information and/or
rm-specic equipment used by the rm, the selling price of capital is lower than its
purchasing price. In particular, we assume that cu
t = ct, where  < 1. Installed
capital depreciates geometrically, kt+1 = kt + it, where  2 (0;1). The productivity
shock follows a rst order Markov processes with transitional density (t+1;t). The
purchasing price of capital has two components: an aggregate component, ~ ct, common
to all rms in this market; and an idiosyncratic component, "t, such that ct = ~ ct"t.
For the sake of simplicity we assume here that the aggregate price is constant, but it
is simple to obtain similar results when ~ ct follows a rst order Markov process. The
idiosyncratic component is iid over time and rms.
The Bellman equation of this problem is:
V (kt;ct;t) = max
fitg
U(kt;t;ct;it) +  EV (kt + it;t) (21)
where  2 (0;1) is the discount factor, V (:) is the value function and
EV (kt + it;t) =
Z Z
V (kt + it;ct+1;t+1) (dt+1;t) c(dct+1) (22)







kP(ct;t)   kt if lnct < ln[ EVk(kt;t)]
0 if ln[ EVk(kt;t)]  lnct  ln[ EVk(kt;t)]   ln
kS(ct;t)   kt if lnct > ln[ EVk(kt;t)]   ln
(23)
where kP(:) and kS(:) are the optimal capital stocks when the rm decides to purchase
new capital and when it sells used capital, respectively; and EVk  @EV=@k. kP(:)
and kS(:) are implicitly dened by the equations:
 EVk(k
P
t ;t) = ct (24)
 EVk(k
S
t ;t) = ct
Notice that if we knew the function EVk(:) we could obtain a closed form expression
for the optimal decision rule. However, EVk(:) has to be obtained recursively. In





































Now, let yt be the sign of the investment at period t, i.e., yt  sign(it) 2
f 1;0;+1g, and dene xt as the vector (kt;t). We dene p(y;x;) as the prob-
ability, conditional on x, that the optimal sign of investment is y, where  is the
vector of structural parameters. Taking into account the optimal decision rule in
(18), it is clear that:
p(1;x;) = c(lnf EVk[k;]g)
p( 1;x;) = 1   c(lnf EVk[k;]g   ln) (26)
Furthermore, the conditional expectations of ct+1 on the right hand side of equation
(20) can be written as a function of the probabilities p(); if we do this and solve for
EVk we obtain an alternative expression for EVk in terms of the probabilities p() and
the primitives , c and Fk. We denote this function by (x;;p[]). As in previous
examples, the function (:) can be evaluated at any vector of probabilities , not
just at the probabilities associated with optimal behavior. Therefore, substituting
the function (x;;p[]) for EVk in (21) we can write p() as the solution of the xed
point equation  = ~ 	(;), where
	(1;x;;) = (lnf [k;;;]g)
	( 1;x;;) = 1   (lnf [k;;;]g   ln)
3 Two{stage estimator
Let fyi;xi : i = 1;2;:::;ng be a random sample of y and x. The Maximum Likelihood









where the probabilities are known to satisfy ~ p() = ~ 	(; ~ p()). The MLE can be ob-
tained using a nested xed point solution -estimation. Consider instead the following
Two-stage Estimator of 







	(yi;xi;; ^ pn) (28)
9For given  the pseudo-likelihood in (23) can be computed with a single evaluation of
the operator e 	, whereas computing the likelihood in (22) requires iterating in e 	 until
convergence. It is clear that using the two-stage estimator may result in large savings
in the computational cost of estimation, extending the class of estimable models.
In Proposition 1 below we give sucient conditions for consistency of the two-stage
estimator, and in Proposition 2 we provide additional conditions under which the
two-stage estimator can be used instead of the Maximum Likelihood estimator at no
cost in terms of asymptotic eciency.
PROPOSITION 1 (Consistency):
Let      [0;1](J 1)M. Consider the following regularity conditions.
(i)  is a compact sets.
(ii) 	(y;x;;) is continuous and twice continuously dierentiable in (;).
(iii) 	(y;x;;) > 0 for any (y;x) 2 Y xX and for any (;) 2  .
(iv) fyi;xig for i = 1;2;:::;n are independently and identically distributed.
(v) There is a 
 2  such that, for any (y;x) 2 Y xX, p(y;x;
) = p(y;x), and
for any  6= 
 the set f(y;x) : 	(y;x;;f
yjx) 6= p(y;x)g has positive probability.
(vi) (
; ~ p) 2 int( ).
(vii) ^ pn is a consistent estimator ~ p.
Under these conditions the two-stage estimator ^ 
2S
n converges a.s. to 
.
Proof: See Appendix.
PROPOSITION 2 (Asymptotic Eciency):
Under regularity conditions (i)-(vii), in Proposition 1, and


















(ix) For any  2 , @~ 	(; ~ p[])=@0 = 0,
the two-stage estimator ^ 
2S
n is asymptotically normal and asymptotically equivalent
to the conditional maximum likelihood estimator.
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Notice that whereas consistency of the rst-stage non-parametric estimators (to-
gether with regularity conditions) is enough to obtain consistency in the second stage,
sucient conditions for asymptotic eciency include an additional restriction on the
model. This is condition (ix) which states that the Jacobian matrix of the xed point
operator should be zero at the xed point. If this is the case, the proof of Proposition
2 shows that the asymptotic variance matrix of the rst stage estimators does not
aect the asymptotic variance of the second stage estimators.
10Aguirregabiria and Mira (1999) have proved that this condition is satised for the
class of problems and for the xed point operator considered in Example 1. However,
in general working with condition (ix) will require a deep understanding of the model
at hand. Even when .we are able to write the distribution of endogenous variables as
a solution of a xed point problem, verifying condition (ix) may be non-trivial, or we
may nd that it is not satised. We now show that, provided a xed point operator
has been found, Newton's algorithm can be used to dene another valid xed point
operator which will satisfy condition (ix).
Consider a model with xed point mapping e 	(:;:). Suppose that for given  we
solve the xed-point problem ~ p() = ~ 	(; ~ p()) using Newton's method to nd a zero
of    ~ 	(;). Newton iterations have the following form:






k   ~ 	(;k)

The following Lemma establishes two relevant porperties of the Newton xed point
operator  ()
LEMMA 1:
(1) A xed point of ~ 	(;:) is a xed point of  (;:) if the inverse of I 
@~ 	(;)
@0
exists, and a xed point of  (;:) is a xed point of ~ 	(;:).




Proof: See Appendix 1.
This suggests that, if a xed operator ~ 	() has been found which does not satisfy
condition (ix), an asymptotically ecient estimator based on the associated Newton
operator may be available.
11APPENDIX 1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Consistency):






ln	(yi;xi;;) ; Qn() = ~ Qn(; ^ pn)
And dene:
~ Q1(;)  E(ln	[di;xi;;])
By Property 24.2 in Gourieroux and Monfort (vol. II, page 387), if: (I) Qn() con-
verges a.s. and uniformly in  to Q1(); and (II) Q1() has a unique maximum in
 at 
; then ^ 
2S
n  argmax
2 Qn() converges a.s. to 
. Regularity condition (v)
implies (II) by the information inequality. We have to prove (I).
By Lemma 24.1 in Gourieroux and Monfort (vol. II, page 392), we have that if: (a)
~ Qn(;) converges a.s. and uniformly in (;) to ~ Q1(;); (b) ~ Q1(;) is uniformly
continuous in (;); and (c) ^ pn converge a.s. to ~ p; then ~ Qn(; ^ pn) converges a.s. and
uniformly in  to ~ Q1(; ~ p)  Q1(). Condition (c) holds directly from (vii). By
regularity conditions (i) and (ii), ~ Q1(;) is continuous on a compact set, so it is
uniformly continuous, i.e., (b) holds. Now, we prove that condition (a) holds.
Let H(:;:) be the true probability distribution of (y;x), and let Hn(:;:) be the
empirical distribution of (y;x) in a sample with size n. By denition, for any (;):











jln	(j;x;;)j jHn(j;x)   H(j;x)j
























n!1jHn(j;x)   H(j;x)j = 0

= 1
i.e., ~ Qn(;) converges a.s. and uniformly in (;) to ~ Q1(;).
Proof of Proposition 2 (Asymptotic eciency):
12Given conditions (ii) and (vii) and the denition of ^ 
2S
n , the rst order conditions
of optimality imply that with probability approaching one @ ~ Qn(^ n)=@ = 0 where
^ n  (^ 
2S0
n ; ^ p0
n)0. By condition (ii), ~ Qn(:) is twice continuously dierentiable and we
can apply the stochastic mean value theorem to @ ~ Qn(:)=@ between ^ n and  
(
0; ~ p)0. There are K vectors f 1
n;  2
n;:::;  K
n g which are convex combinations of ^ n
and  such that:









@2 ~ Qn( 1
n)=@1@0
:::




A(^ n   
)
Given that any  j
n is a convex linear combination of ^ n and , and given that ^ n !a:s:
, then  j
n !a:s: . Furthermore, @2 ~ Qn()=@@0 converges in probability and uni-
formly in  to @2 ~ Q1()=@@0 and therefore @2 ~ Qn( j
n)=@j@0 !p @2 ~ Q1()=@j@0
(see Amemiya, Thm 4.2.2 and Thm.4.1.5). We can now rewrite the previous mean



































!   p
n@ ~ Qn()=@ p
n(^ pn   ~ p)
!
Notice that condition (vi) implies that @2 ~ Q1()=@@
0 is a non singular (negative












































By condition (ix), for any pair (y;x): (a) 	(y;x;) = p(y;x;
); (b) @	(y;x;)=@ =
0; and (c) @	(y;x;)=@ = @p(y;x;
)=@. Therefore, @2 ~ Q1()=@@0 = 0 by



















Proof of Lemma 1:
The xed point problem is  = e 	(;). The associated Newton operator was
dened as






   ~ 	(;)

where , 	 and   are vectors of dimension M. The proof of (1) trivial given the
denition of  . As for (2), let  be a xed point of  ; taking derivatives we get
D (












= I   0   I = 0
since  is also a xed point of 	.
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